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LIKE SNOW TO THE ESKIMOS AND TRUMP TO THE REPUBLICAN PARTY:  





 Because we generally see little advantage in distinguishing among 
various kinds of snow, we are amused by the idea that the Eskimo languages 
have a great number of words for it—even if that idea is false. We can 
appreciate however, that “affirmative consent” can take many forms. 
Objections to and support for affirmative-consent standards will vary 
depending not only on the reader’s perspective but also on how the affirmative-
consent standard is implemented. 
 
 The drafters of the American Law Institute’s draft sexual assault 
provisions have defined “consent” in a striking number of ways over the past 
several months. Commentary accompanying those provisions has also shifted 
quickly over this period. The earlier commentary clearly classified the proposal 
as an affirmative-consent standard, even though it rejected the requirement 
advocated by some that sexual penetration be preceded by verbal permission. 
More recent drafts, on the other hand, claim to reject an affirmative-consent 
approach in favor of a “contextual-consent” model.  
 
 In a previous piece,2 I traced the recent “consent” definitions through 
Council Draft No. 33 and argued that the alleged shift from affirmative to 
contextual consent changed little of substance and did not respond to the most 
serious problems with the earlier drafts, which I had previously discussed at 
length.4 This short follow up addresses the changes between Council Draft No. 
3 and the newest draft, Preliminary Draft No. 6.5 In some respects, the current 
draft reverses course on concessions previously made to critics. In others, the 
current draft makes changes that appear to respond to concerns but couple them 
with other changes that undermine the reform. And on the central issue of the 
mens rea required for conviction, the draft continues an approach that likely 
would be implemented so as to impose liability for those guilty of mere tort 
negligence in failing to recognize the social harm they were risking—that their 
                                                          
1 © 2016, Kevin Cole. Professor, University of San Diego, School of Law. 
2 Kevin Cole, Backpedalling in Place: The ALI’s Move from “Affirmative” to “Contextual” 
Consent (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714057). 
3 MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (Council Draft No. 3, Dec. 15, 
2015) [hereinafter DEC. DRAFT]. 
4 Kevin Cole, Better Sex Through Criminal Law: Proxy Crimes, Covert Negligence, and Other 
Difficulties of “Affirmative Consent” in the ALI’s Draft Sexual Assault Provisions, ___  SAN 
DIEGO L. REV.  ___ (forthcoming 2016) (Oct. 2015 draft available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2670419). 
5 MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (Preliminary Draft  No. 6, Mar. 
2, 20165) [hereinafter CURRENT DRAFT]. 
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partners were not willing to engage in the sex act in question.6 This was the 
most troubling feature of the project’s early affirmative-consent proposals, and 
it persists, regardless of the word used to describe it. 
 
I. MENS REA 
 
The current draft changes the definition of consent but is still most 
likely to be interpreted contrary to the Model Penal Code’s usual approach 
requiring subjective culpability regarding the social harm at issue—the 
partner’s unwillingness. Previously, the draft forbade penetration in the absence 
of “positive agreement,” and later “agreement.” Now, the draft forbids 
penetration without “behavior, including words, conduct, acts, and omissions, 
that communicates willingness to engage in a specific act of sexual 
penetration.” Like earlier versions, the current consent definition articulates an 
objective conception of consent—consent is not the partner’s mental state, but 
rather certain manifestations of the partner’s mental state, the “behavior . . . that 
communicates willingness.”  
 
As argued previously,7 these kinds of objective standards are especially 
likely to be viewed as questions of law not subject to the mens rea language in 
a statute.8 Presumably the jury will determine which historical facts the actor 
nonrecklessly believed. Then the jury will determine the normative question of 
whether those historical facts suffice to establish “behavior . . . that 
communicates willingness.” That normative question is one regarding which 
the actor’s mens rea is not clearly required, and it is the kind of question that is 
often regarded as a legal question to which mens rea requirements do not apply. 
In essence, the actor’s subjective mental state is likely to be relevant regarding 
the historical facts regarding consent, but not whether those facts would suffice 
to meet the normative standard of consent.9 
 
                                                          
6 For elaboration of the idea that the social harm in sexual assault turns on the subjective mental 
state of the partner, see Cole, supra note 2, at 6. 
7 See id. at 8.  
8 The switch from “positive agreement” and “agreement” to the current “behavior . . . that 
communicates willingness” eliminates the argument that “agreement,” because of its use in 
contracts, implies a reasonableness standard. But the current standard still appears to be an 
objective standard, and the commentary to the current draft reinforces that impression. 
9 For a recent example of this approach, see Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), 
involving the question of whether defendant was guilty of making a prohibited “threat.” While 
the majority rejected the view that the requirement was met when a person intentionally uttered 
words that a reasonable person would have taken to be a threat, Justice Thomas’s dissenting 
opinion suggests a different analysis. Id. at 2019 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) 
(“Under this ‘conventional mens rea element,’ ‘the defendant [must] know the facts that make 
his conduct illegal,’  but he need not know that those facts make his conduct illegal. It has long 
been settled that ‘the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge 
as distinguished from knowledge of the law.’”); id. at 2021 (“Knowing that the communication 
contains a ‘threat’—a serious expression of an intention to engage in unlawful physical 
violence—does not, however, require knowing that a jury will conclude that the communication 
contains a threat as a matter of law.”). 
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The current draft’s many illustrations that require the actor to be at least 
reckless regarding consent do not conflict with this reading, since in each one 
the mens rea requirement could be applied to the historical component of the 
consent requirement rather than to normative component. Indeed, given that the 
draft has now specified the mental state its proxy rule seeks to serve 
(willingness), the illustrations would most likely speak in terms of willingness 
(instead of consent) when they discuss mens rea if they were indeed intended 
to signal that the actor must be subjectively culpable about what the partner’s 
behavior means. That is certainly how the commentary spoke several drafts ago 
when it tried to make that point in defense of its proposal to apply the 
affirmative-consent model to all sexual conduct.10 Nothing in the current 
illustrations speaks to mens rea in this way. In fact, Illustration 2 in the current 
draft speaks in negligence language, though in a somewhat confusing way.11 
 
II. THE UNDERLYING SOCIAL HARM 
 
The draft’s shift from “positive agreement” and “agreement” to 
“behavior communicating willingness” is an advance in that it removes one 
element of ambiguity from those earlier formulations—the draft’s view of the 
partner’s mental state that describes the social harm sought to be avoided with 
the draft’s proxy rules. We now know that the mental state is unwillingness, 
rather than unwelcomeness, lack of enthusiasm, and the like.  
 
But we may know less than we think. The Reporters’ Memorandum 
proclaimed that Council Draft No. 3 “eliminates language requiring the consent 
to be ‘positive,’ ‘freely given,’ and ‘absent until . . . communicated.’”12 But in 
the current draft, the “freely given” requirement reappears in slightly different 
garb. The draft requires that “All the circumstances must be considered in 
determining whether a person has given consent, including any physical or 
verbal resistance and any circumstances preventing or constraining 
resistance.”13 
 
This open-ended language has the potential to undo any increased 
clarity the draft may have promised. That is because a partner’s willingness is 
usually influenced by many factors, some of which we will deem to vitiate 
consent. For example, one might say that a person is willing to have sex when 
threatened with death as an alternative, in that the person prefers sex to death. 
Obviously, if the consent standard were our only weapon, we would need to 
                                                          
10 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES at 127 (Discussion Draft 
No. 2, Apr. 28, 2015) (emphasis added) (“If the actor honestly and sincerely believes the date 
went well and a sexual overture is welcomed, there should not be liability even if the other person 
in fact found the date insufferable, and yet continued to be politely accommodating. The Code 
requires that the actor be at least recklessly aware of the absence of consent—in other words, 
aware of a risk that the other person does not in fact welcome the behavior.”). 
11  See CURRENT DRAFT, supra note 5, at 6 (“And even if B were not thought to have consented, 
A could reasonably believe that she had; he was not reckless as to whether she had consented.”). 
12 DEC. DRAFT, supra note 3,  at xi. 
13 CURRENT DRAFT, supra note 5, § 213.0(3)(b) (emphasis added). 
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have a provision indicating that a threat of death vitiates consent. Although 
consent is not the draft’s only weapon, the draft already has a provision 
specifying certain specific conditions as vitiating consent.14 
 
The open-ended language about circumstances constraining resistance 
could be used to add to this list in unpredictable ways. For example, if a partner 
agrees to sex because of an actor’s cajolery, is the partner’s continuing 
resistance been constrained by that cajolery? To abstract from a recently 
publicized case, if a partner agreed to have sex rather than walking across a 
cold campus to her own dorm room, knowing that the actor would not let her 
stay unless they had sex, is the partner’s continued resistance constrained by 
the choice she faced?  
 
If “circumstances . . . constraining resistance” is not given a narrow 
interpretation, the apparent gain in clarity achieved by the reformulated consent 
standard will quickly take on the same murky quality that the drafters claimed 
to reject in Council Draft No. 3. 
 
III. OBJECTIVE CONSENT STANDARDS AND THE BASELINE 
QUESTION 
 
Council Draft No. 3 stated, “Although a subjective definition of 
‘consent’ has appeal, only a conduct-based conception of consent is 
workable.”15 Apparently, the drafters thereafter became aware that the 
Restatement of Torts has for many years defined “consent” in subjective terms, 
for the current draft states, “Although a subjective definition of consent has 
appeal, only a behavior-based concept is workable in the criminal law.”16 
 
The draft nowhere explains this position. But one obvious difference is 
that in the criminal law, the actor needs to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. And so one might infer that the reason the drafters believe a subjective 
standard would be unworkable in the criminal law is that convictions would be 
too hard to obtain under that standard. 
 
The same could be said, of course, about the other crimes covered by 
the Model Penal Code, for which the Code typically required subjective 
awareness of the risk of social harm, or at least gross negligence regarding that 
risk. It is doubtless true that the problems of proving guilt of sexual assault are 
typically greater than the problems of proof surrounding many crimes. It is also 
true, however, that in sexual assault cases, proving innocence is harder too. 
 
Many jurisdictions do apply objective consent standards in sexual 
assault cases. A question remains as to what baseline the ALI should consult in 
                                                          
14 Id. § 213.0(3)(d). 
15 DEC. DRAFT, supra note 3, at 2.  
16 CURRENT DRAFT, supra note 5, at 3 (emphasis added). 
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assessing the draft. Should it look to how the draft fits with the principles of the 
Model Penal Code, or instead look to the state of the law across the country? 
Some skepticism is justified regarding objective consent standards in the states. 
They developed against a backdrop of resistance requirements that largely 
eliminated the need to think about fairness to the defendant in the consent 
standard. Indeed, many jurisdictions made consent a strict liability element. 
More generally, politicians rarely lose votes by being tough on crime. In 
California, for example, simple negligence in causing death by automobile is a 
crime. That the Model Penal Code’s approach has not gained uniform 
acceptance is insufficient reason to abandon it now. Indeed, if anything, 
developments since the promulgation of the Model Penal Code suggest that 
now more than ever, a model of fair criminal law is a useful counterweight to 
the pressures that push legislators toward harsh criminal responses to social 
problems. 
 
IV. REFORM THROUGH FATIGUE 
 
ALI critics of the sexual assault proposal could not be faulted for 
feeling as if they are in a game of Whack-a-Mole designed to end in rotator-
cuff surgery. High penalties for sex in the absence of affirmative consent were 
replaced with misdemeanor penalties, but have now risen to the felony level 
again. Early versions of the project included a provision that would criminalize 
a wide range of inducements that would vitiate apparent consent, a provision 
eliminated only to be replaced with an open-ended requirement that consent be 
“freely given,” which has now been replaced with a requirement of attention to 
circumstances constraining resistance. Critics concerned that commentary 
favorable to defendants did not match the statutory text saw the text amended 
to include some of those ideas, only to see that text disappear in the most recent 
draft.17 Bold proclamations of a shift from “affirmative” to “contextual” 
consent end up, on examination, to have changed very little.18 
 
Public-choice theory teaches that those most interested tend to win in 
the legislative process. The ALI is not immune from this dynamic. Specialists 
in sexual assault law have greater incentives to see their ideas embraced than 
generalists have to oppose them. Eventually, even dedicated and thoughtful 
generalists will be tempted to point to the progress they have made in reining 
in the specialists and to declare victory. The losers in the process await 
identification, through the criminal process. 
 
                                                          
17 Compare, e.g., DEC. DRAFT, supra note 3, § 213.0(3)(b) (“Neither verbal nor physical 
resistance is required to establish the absence of consent, but lack of physical or verbal resistance 
may be considered, together with all other circumstances, in determining whether a person has 
given consent.”), with CURRENT DRAFT, supra note 5, § 213.0(3)(b) (“Neither verbal nor physical 
resistance is required to establish the absence of consent.”). 
18 See Cole, supra note 2. 
